legitimacy to a "separate but equal" segregation statute.' 0 The Fuller Court's legacy was an unmatched record of reactionary, bigoted, and rejected precedents, with few brilliant, prophetic decisions thrown in to right the balance.
The Fuller Court represented (until the election of Warren Harding in 1920) the last stand of orthodoxy in the face of the Progressive revolution. Fuller's misfortune was that he and most of his colleagues followed a political ideology that had fallen out of favor, just as the revolution was occurring. Somebody has to end an era. Even so, the Fuller Court gave nineteenth-century legal orthodoxy an ungraceful exit. The problem was not so much that its members were predominantly committed to the common law, suspicious of regulation and the welfare state, and influenced by numerous racial prejudices. All these things could be said equally of Justice Holmes, its most illustrious dissenter. The central problem of the Fuller Court was that it united its prejudices with an expansive and ill-considered conception of judicial power that enabled the Justices to strike down all manner of legislation by employing highly creative interpretations of the Constitution. Then it used that power selectively. For example, "due process" was given a broad and unprecedented meaning in Lochner, but "equal protection" was constrained to its narrowest possible meaning in Plessy.
Fiss' presentation of the Fuller Court is balanced and more sophisticated and theoretical than many of the volumes in the Holmes Devise. It is not very chronological, and that may disturb some readers. Plessy (1896) comes in the very last chapter, while Lochner (1905) is treated mainly in the first twohundred pages. Fiss chose, I believe correctly, to organize the Fuller Court analytically rather than chronologically. However, a few things become lost in this organization. For example, Plessy was part of the road to substantive due process, not simply tacked on at the end. Both substantive due process and Plessy were part of the historical development of judicial analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment. Why was it that the Court was so tolerant of state regulatory intervention in race relations but so intolerant of regulatory intervention in the economy? Sticking Plessy in the last chapter, removed from the substantive due process debate, does not serve to cast light on this question.
The Fuller Court dealt with three major legal/intellectual debates that dominated the two-decade period falling just before and just after the turn of the century. These concerned the Progressive welfare agenda, the antitrust and [Vol. 104: 2309 regulated industries movement, and the first major debate since the Civil War over the scope of federal protection for civil and political rights. Fiss' book handles these issues with skill, focusing somewhat less on the language of the judicial decisions than earlier Holmes Devise volumes, and somewhat more on the political and social history of the times. At the same time, however, Fiss' treatment presents its own ambiguities and problems of perspective.
I. CONTRACTARIANISM AND THE PROGRESSIVE POLICY AGENDA Fiss argues that the Fuller Court thwarted Progressive reform legislation by subjecting it to a contractarian analysis that the Court found justified mainly by the Fourteenth Amendment. The result was substantive due process-the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause can be used to strike down the substance of state legislation rather than simply as a guarantee of procedural fairness"-identified today mainly with the Court's decision in Lochner v. New York
The group of academics and politicians we call the Progressives held views at odds with nineteenth-century orthodoxy in several ways. In economics they were neoclassicists rather than classicists.'
2 As such, they had less faith than their predecessors in the robustness of markets, and correspondingly more faith in the usefulness of state intervention. The Progressives were more committed than their predecessors to state regulation of business and to state policymaking concerning the distribution of wealth. They tended to see the common law as ineffective for achieving the state's "public" policy goals, or even as affirmatively harmful.
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Progressive intellectuals, although not necessarily Progressive politicians, were also by and large Darwinians. Darwinism entailed accommodation of the social sciences,' 4 but it also had powerful if controversial implications for determining the role of the state in issues of welfare and human development.
To the extent Progressives were influenced by Darwin, they were "Reform" Darwinists rather than "Social" Darwinists. Social Darwinists and Reform Darwinists had radically different views about the respective roles of state and market. Social Darwinists believed that the state should let social conditions and the market take care of themselves, thus permitting the evolutionary process to run its course. By contrast, Reform Darwinists emphasized that while all organisms are subject to evolutionary processes, human beings are different in that they are aware of the evolutionary process and thus able to direct it and use it to best advantage.' Thus, Reform Darwinists were statists, and a few were even radical statists. The substantive due process ideology of the Fuller Court was also radical, but in different ways. First, during the substantive due process era the Supreme Court seemed to give government regulation much closer scrutiny, striking down many more statutes than it had in the past. Second, the justifications on which the Court relied to strike down legislation were either poorly articulated in the constitutional text or not articulated at all; they were also largely absent from the debates of the Constitution's drafters.
Fiss quite properly notes that the latter point should not be pushed too far. Constitutional interpretation in the nineteenth century was based on fairly broad principles and was "not an exercise in clause-parsing," 16 as it has often become today. Nevertheless, the mode of constitutional analysis that characterized substantive due process was unprecedented, particularly the Justices' willingness to strike down both state and federal statutes that were not obviously in conflict with any specific constitutional provision. Nearly every historian who has written about the subject has felt obliged to produce some explanation, or model, for making sense out of what looks very much like Justices simply writing down their political views and calling it constitutional adjudication.' 7 Fiss' own explanation is that the defining ideology of the Fuller Court toward welfare legislation was contractarianism. 18 The Justices believed that the Constitution was a social compact in the Lockean sense, and that reaching ultimate constitutional values meant not simply looking at the text of the Constitution but also putting oneself in place of the original contracting parties. Since a contract requires unanimous consent, the constitutional interpreter must ask what kinds of state actions would have received such consent. 19 Clearly, state-forced wealth transfers would not have received unanimous consent, for losers would never have agreed; likewise, the original contractors would not have given up their future economic liberty of contract without a very good reason. Fiss believes that even though the conservative Justices were naturally attracted to this idea by their own political ideology, they found it already well established in nineteenth-century constitutional theory. They also found support in the Social Darwinism that permeated elite thinking during the 15. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV. 645, 654-55 (1985) .
16. Fiss, supra note 1, at 85. 17. See infra text accompanying note 30. 18. See FiSS, supra note 1, at 45-49, 81-83, 158-59, 176-77, 186-87, 389-95. 1880's and 1890's.' This contractarian theory guided not only explicit substantive due process decisions such as Lochner but also the decisions that invalidated the federal income tax, 2 ' that authorized federal intervention in labor disputes, 22 and that limited the rights of resident aliens and citizens of U.S. territories, on the premise that these people had not been participants in the formation of the contract. 23 Fiss concludes that "[t~he theory of the social contract prevalent in the nineteenth century defined the bargaining relationship among the founders in such a way as to deny government the power to redistribute wealth." ' 24 Further, this social contract ideology differed from Rawlsian ideology in that the constitutional social contract of the nineteenth century was not negotiated behind a "veil of ignorance." 5 The bargainers knew what they had and what they wanted. The wealthy would never have assented to a contract bargaining away their wealth. "Accordingly, they conditioned their consent, so the story went, on an assurance that their holdings would not be taken by the newly established government for the purpose of altering the distribution of wealth." 26 Fiss argues that the contractarianism of the Fuller Court entailed a sharp distinction between the social and the political. In cases of conflict, social interests took priority over political ones. Although much less formal, Fuller-era contractarianism nevertheless has much in common with modem contractarianism. Principally, it viewed markets as the product of private, social orderings, not as creatures of state policy. The priority given to social over political orderings meant that the state's appropriate role was to act as market facilitator, rather than market substitute. have achieved the requisite unanimous consent at the time the social compact was formed.
This contractarianism also led the Fuller court to a very rigid conception of social rights. Fiss observes:
[T]echniques had to be found that simultaneously placed limits on the power of the state and that were consistent with the democratic aspiration that made the consent of the people the source of state authority. The solution lay in the idea of contract. Consent may be the ultimate source of legitimacy for the state, but that to which the people gave their consent-a contract-is not open to constant revision. It is fixed once and for all. Naturally enough, the Constitution became this contract, and it was the Constitution that the Fuller Court drew upon in defining the bounds of the modem state. 29 The idea that substantive due process and the Supreme Court's more general hostility toward wealth transfers were constitutionalized contractualism is both simple and attractive. It also faces formidable conceptual and historical problems, however, that require more analysis than Fiss provides. Although he asserts his thesis repeatedly and in the context of several different constitutional doctrines, he gives little support for it from the Fuller Court's judicial opinions or the biographies of the Fuller Justices. To be sure, he does note that many of the Fuller Court's decisions about economic regulation and wealth transfers were consistent with a contractarian ideology. However, alternative accountings are equally consistent.
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A more elaborate inquiry into the relation between contractarian political ideology and Gilded Age constitutional theory must account for the following problems. First, although some contemporary critics of the Fuller Court agreed that social contract theory guided the Court's hostility toward economic and welfare legislation, the number of such critics was small, and contractarianism was by no means a dominant target of the Progressive critique. Second, the social contract did not play a significant role in classical political economy, whether English or American. Third, no case can be made from the Fuller Court's opinions that substantive due process reflected a form of constitutional contractualism. To the contrary, that Court very largely abandoned contractarian language that was quite common in earlier decisions discussing ex post facto legislation, impairments of the obligation of contract, and, in a few instances, forcible wealth transfers. Fourth, any notion that the Social Darwinists were social contractarians is historically wrong, although the substantive due process Justices may incorrectly have read the Social Darwinist literature that way.
A. Contemporary Critics
Fiss describes the Fuller Court and substantive due process as contractarian, but he does not cite to contemporary literature making that claim, a curious omission given that the Gilded Age Supreme Court had an unprecedented number of intellectual critics. For example, James B. Thayer blasted the Court for abandoning traditional judicial reticence to declare statutes unconstitutional. 3 ' Roscoe Pound accused the Court of developing a "mechanical" jurisprudence of conceptions, rather than a truly scientific jurisprudence, and of adhering to outmoded concepts of individual rights at a time when social rights were moving to the fore. 3 Justice Holmes accused the Court of being paranoid about what it perceived as growing socialism."
The idea that substantive due process was an expression of contractarian ideology did appear occasionally. For example, Princeton University's great constitutional scholar Edward S. Corwin argued that substantive due process expressed a working out of contractarian ideology that was thought by judges to be rooted in the Constitution. Corwin found plenty of evidence that lateeighteenth-century political thought was contractarian, 35 but little evidence that contractarian ideology dominated the thought of substantive due process judges.
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Corwin aside, Progressive critiques did not see contractarianism as the root of substantive due process ideology. They were much more inclined to see it as an expression of legal "formalism," as an excessive concern with classification rather than policy, or simply as paranoia about a feared social revolution. Otherwise they blamed it on rigid adherence to outmoded ideas of classical political economy. 37 Classical political economy and Lockean social contract theory also share one important premise: Starting from complete economic self-interest, both proceed to a theory of market and state in which private ordering is given the highest priority. This places classical political economy and social contract theory in sharp contrast to the competing republican vision, which emphasizes virtue and representation rather than self-interest and individual selfdetermination. 39 It also tends to place the classical political economists in the Lockean camp with respect to such things as rights in private property.
However, the classical political economists were not contractarians. The formal union of contractarian ideology and political economy is very largely a twentieth-century invention. 40 Adam Smith himself explicitly rejected Lockean contractarianism as the justification for government. 4 ' Later political economists generally ignored the social contract. Their theories of state nonintervention were not based on notions of contractual autonomy but rather on economic efficiency. To be sure, the jump from one ideology to the other need not be very far. Efficiency is nothing more than the ability of a given amount of resources to satisfy the maximum number of desires. Nonetheless, the classical political economists ignored Locke, Hume, and Rousseau on the social contract. Malthus and Ricardo, for example, had virtually nothing to say on the subject. 4 2 John Stuart Mill's Principles of Political Economy contained a long defense of laissez-faire, based on several independent grounds, but the social contract was not among them. 3 The story of American political economists is very much the same. Francis Wayland, Henry Carey, and Thomas Cooper never discussed the social contract.' Even Jacksonians such as Henry Vethake, whose thought contributed heavily to substantive due process, said nothing. Vethake did write at some length on laissez-faire and the duty of government not to interfere with the workings of the market. But his rationales were all related to traditional economic concerns for market efficiency and did not mention the social contract. . ) (concluding that Georgia legislature's power to confiscate property and banish individual "grows out of the very nature of the social compact, which must reside somewhere, and which is so inherent in the legislature, that it cannot be divested, or transferred, without an express provision of the constitution"); Talbot v. Janson. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 133, 139 (1795) ("The right of expatriation is antecedent and superior to the law of society. It is implied, likewise, in the nature and object of the social compact, which was formed to shield the weakness. and to supply the wants of individuals .... Whenever these purposes fail, either the whole society is dissolved, or the suffering individuals are permitted to withdraw from it.").
approval or disapproval for certain types of legislation by alluding to basic principles of the social contract. 47 The Supreme Court continued to use such language, although far less frequently, after the end of the Fuller period. 4 8 Although the federal Constitution did not explicitly refer to the social contract, many early state constitutions did, and Supreme Court decisions sometimes construed these provisions as well.
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The nineteenth-century Supreme Court frequently referred to social contract theory as its rationale for striking down ex post facto legislation, state impairments of contractual obligations, or state attempts to tax citizens in order to provide business subsidies. These decisions were all thought to involve a status or expectation that had become "vested," and that the state subsequently modified or took away. A basic principle of the social contract, the Justices wrote, was that the state could not interfere with previously made contracts, renege on its own bargains, or apply legislation to events that had occurred before the legislation was passed. 5 "
In sum, the nineteenth-century Supreme Court had a well-defined concept of the social contract, which often became an artifice for condemning statutes where the constitutional language was inapplicable or ambiguous. For example, although the Constitution does not explicitly forbid a state from taking property from one person and giving it to another, as in debtor-relief legislation, the social contract did. Or, alternatively, although the federal Constitution's Contract Clause does not apply to the federal government, it would violate the principles of the social compact not to impose a similar obligation on all governmental levels. 51 But the Court used the rhetoric of social contract only to speak of "vested" rights-that is, settled expectations or previous obligations that the state had created and then attempted to change. The Court ventured further only in a few decisions dealing with taxation for private purposes or rate regulation. 52 Contractarian language in nineteenth-century judicial opinions was largely the work of Federalists and, later, anti-Jacksonians. Its main use was in opposition to debtor-relief legislation and Jacksonian attempts to amend corporate charters retroactively. 53 The Jacksonian agenda in such cases was generally to eliminate the state-created privileges of entrepreneurial interests, like tax relief, monopoly grants, and other special advantages. The opposition then protested that undoing these previous commitments violated the social contract. Debtor-relief legislation was a similarly popular agenda item for Jacksonian state legislatures. When Federalist and Whig Justices struck down that legislation, or dissented from decisions refusing to strike it down, they used contractarian language.5 4 Substantive due process, by contrast, was a uniquely Jacksonian tool.
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Its fierce commitment to state noninterference in business grew out of a Jacksonian disdain for the special privileges accorded to entrepreneurs with established wealth or social position. 6 In sum, social contract language was 50. See sources cited supra note 47.
51. An important point of James B. Thayer's critique of judicial review. written in the 1890's before Lochner was decided, was to prevent this type of judicial activism when the express constiutional language seemed to permit judgment either way. an anti-Jacksonian tool in the nineteenth century, while substantive due process was a distinctly Jacksonian phenomenon. As a result, any historical interpretation attributing Lochner to contractarianism faces a formidable historical obstacle of misplaced pedigree. While Federalist constitutional law scholars such as Joseph Story used contractualist arguments to explain what was wrong with state attempts to upset vested rights, 57 the Jacksonian treatise writers whose work gave us substantive due process more or less ignored such rationales. For example, Thomas M. Cooley's sustained argument for state nonintervention in his Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, which probably contributed more to substantive due process doctrine than any other volume, can hardly be characterized as contractualism. Even Cooley's treatment of ex post facto laws 5 8 and the Contract Clause 59 --the two constitutional areas that most frequently occasioned contractarian analysis-avoids discussion of the social contract. Indeed, one of Cooley's most important goals was to limit the scope of the Contract Clause, particularly to the set of rules holding that once rights were bestowed on corporations through their charters, these rights could not be taken back. 6 0
The current, more technical contractarianism that we identify with James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and Richard Epstein on the right, 6 ' or with John Rawls on the left, 62 simply has no analogue in nineteenth-or early-twentiethcentury legal thought. Under the modem view, one looks at the full social ordering that the contracting individuals might have contemplated, and tries to determine the limits of state power to interfere in markets under such a system. Depending on one's ideology, this leads either to the libertarian view that only economic or regulatory policies that would have been supported by unanimous (1991) REv. 4, 71-74 (1994). consent are "constitutional, 63 or to the position that a sovereign's interference in the market or a forcible wealth transfer constitutes a "taking" unless every affected person either benefits in proportion to his existing wealth or receives compensation.' By contrast, leftist contractarian political reasoning leads to a state obligation to create policy priorities that equalize wealth or bring the worst-off individuals up to some higher level. This approach to the social contract, by contrast, permits a great deal of market interference as well as outright wealth transfer. 6 5
Contractarian discourse in the pre-New Deal Supreme Court virtually never broke from the "vested fights" framework into which it was originally cast. As the Court moved from a vested rights model emphasizing previous commitments to a model emphasizing substantive state noninterference, it simply stopped using contractarian language altogether. So Lochner, Pollock, and other Fuller-era economic regulation decisions are hardly contractarian. Rather, they stood firmly in a Jacksonian tradition that eschewed contractualist rhetoric. When the Court turned from vested to substantive rights, it abandoned a well-developed tradition of using social contract rhetoric that initially had been applied in vested rights cases.
Indeed, the Fuller Court even abandoned contractarian language in areas where it had been previously used. Only five Fuller Court opinions contain any reference to the social contract or compact, and three of those were written by Justice Harlan, who commonly dissented from substantive due process decisions or other decisions striking down Progressive welfare legislation. Further, in most of these decisions the social contract language was used to justify, rather than strike down, the statute at issue. 66 The Contract Clause and other vested rights decisions of the Fuller Court make no reference to the social contract or the political obligations that it entails. Nor was contractarian language applied in the substantive due process cases attacking protective labor legislation. This omission is important, because Fiss' own argument is that the nineteenth-century mode of constitutional interpretation depended not so much on technical analysis of the text, but on the application of general underlying principles. This contractarian principle was never generalized. Considering the three dozen or so cases using contractarian language earlier in the nineteenth century, the Fuller Court appears less contractarian than its predecessors. Indeed, during the Fuller period contractarian language largely disappears from the rhetoric of the Justices, never to return. 67 Perhaps the most important exceptions are some ambiguous references in Pollock, the income tax case.
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Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Fuller laboriously reconstructed the intent of the Constitution's Framers regarding the relationship between taxation and representation. The intent behind the constitutional requirement that direct taxes be apportioned according to population was "that the consent of those who were expected to pay it was essential to the validity of any tax. ' ' 69 In Pollock, the Chief Justice's analysis was very specific to a single clause in the Constitution, and none of this spilled over into the substantive due process decisions.
The social contract thesis also fails to account for the fact that the substantive due process Court had a well-developed theory of externalities. An externality is an effect on a party who cannot practicably be brought into the bargaining relationship because rights or entitlements have not been suitably defined, or because the third party has not been identified or perhaps is not yet born at the time of bargaining. Externalities can also occur simply because the transaction costs of including third parties is too high, for example, when there are many such persons.
By the Fuller period, the emergent view of political economists was that a robust externality justified state interference. 7 ' An example used by Cambridge economist Arthur C. Pigou during the Progressive era was the contract to build in a high-density urban area. The landowner and the architect/builder would contract to maximize their joint wealth, but they would not account for the impact of the building on access to sunlight, use of public utilities, police and fire protection, and other problems relating to urban density. The rights of others with respect to these effects are difficult to identify, and the costs of identifying those affected make their inclusion in the original bargain impossible. Instead, the government must intervene by passing land use legislation that regulates building heights, density, and the like. 7 '
For the social contractarian, the problem of externalities is far more difficult. Political economists saw the appropriateness of state intervention as 67. The only recent exception is Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483 Ct. (1994 , holding that Title VII amendments expanding plaintiffs' procedural rights and remedies do not apply to cases pending on appeal at time statute was enacted. Justice Stevens, speaking for the Court, quoted THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison) for the proposition that ex post facto laws are "contrary to the first principles of the social compact. " Id. at 1498 n.20 (quoting TE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 301 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961 presenting a simple question of efficiency, in which one must merely determine the measure of intervention to correct the market failure. By contrast, if the standard for intervention is contractarianism's unanimous consent, even legislation narrowly defined simply to correct the externality falls short; it will not receive the consent of either the landowner or the builder, both of whom are made worse off. As a result, contractarian political ideology is even more radical in its laissez-faire philosophy than is the ideology of the classical political economists.' The Fuller Court, as well as later substantive due process Courts, took a position on externalities that was much closer to the position of the political economists than to any notion of contractarianism. For example, when Justice Peckham looked for a justification for the bakers' hours law in Lochner, he proclaimed that he could find no relationship between the hours that bakers worked and the healthful quality of their bread. 73 The implication was that, had such a relationship existed, the statute would have been approved. Healthful bread was an externality; the cost of identifying bread customers, defining their rights, and letting them participate in the employment bargain would be too high. Four years later, in Welch v. Swasey, Justice Peckham wrote the opinion for the Court upholding an ordinance limiting the heights of buildings, citing the same externalities Pigou discussed. 7 In that case, the contractual relationship did have the requisite effects on third parties to justify state intervention. Likewise, in the waning years of substantive due process, long after Fuller was gone, Justice Sutherland wrote opinions for the Court striking down a minimum wage statute for women 75 but upholding comprehensive land use planning, once again referring to a list of externalities. 76 The most important externalities decision of the Fuller era was
Muller v. Oregon, where the Supreme Court upheld a maximum hours statute applied to women, noting the importance of women in the birthing and rearing of children, and the impact that excessive fatigue could therefore have on the health of future generations.' It thus seems that a better case can be made that the Fuller Court was adopting a particular theory of political economy than a particular theory of social contract. 82-90 (1941) . Corwin concluded that although the primary cause of substantive due process jurisprudence was classical political economy, for which he quoted mainly from John Stuart Mill, a secondary cause was Social Darwinism. He rather confusingly mixed the two, as if Adam Smith and Darwin somehow had a common origin. Finally, he cited several substantive due process decisions as being consistent with both classical political economy and Social Darwinism. Corwin relied in part on the doctrinal dissertation of one of his students, Benjamin Twiss, published that same year as B. TwISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1941 in the state courts long antedated Darwin and is best associated with the Jacksonian movement.
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Whether or not substantive due process was constitutionalized Darwinism, any contractarian ideology on the Fuller Court almost certainly did not come from Social Darwinism. Superficially, Social Darwinism and contractualism both supported a minimalist state and abhorred forced redistribution of wealth or opportunity-but Social Darwinism and contractualism arrived at that position from quite different starting points. The social contract was based on a cooperative strategy that was inimical to Social Darwinism's basic idea that the human species and its institutions developed out of conflict. To be sure, this does not mean that Fiss' conclusion is incorrect. The intellectualism of lawyers is often parasitic and superficial. They may have seen something in Social Darwinism that reinforced their contractarian ideology, notwithstanding the fundamental antinomies between the "social contract," in Lockean liberal terms, and "the struggle for existence," in the quite illiberal paradigm of Social Darwinism.
Social Darwinists believed that all human institutions, including the State, were the product of a long period of natural selection-that is, of struggle, trial, and error in which the "fittest" practices and policies tended to survive (or enabled the societies that developed them to survive) while the less fit practices did not. Nothing as rational and optimistic as a social compact ever emerged from this process. Furthermore, the institutions themselves changed as the status of civilization changed. For example, common property prevailed as long as people were wandering nomads, but then gave way to private property as people became more settled and agrarian.' This theory led Herbert Spencer, the intellectual leader of the Social Darwinists, to categorically reject the conception that there is a single, static nature of the state that a social contract might produce.8 Initially, political arrangements were determined by inherited hierarchies. Spencer believed that only relatively late in civilization did this "status" conception of social organization give way to a more "contractual" notion of organization.' But even this contractual conception was nothing more than a slowly evolving device for maximizing the freedom of individual organisms to further their own chances for survival. 87 From that point, Spencer developed his own theory of the state with no reference whatsoever to any kind of social compact. The state in Spencer's conception was designed to enable the evolutionary process to run its course to the best advantage of its members; it was not in any way designed to reflect the preferences of a group of citizens bargaining together. Contractarianism assumes human actors with free will, a well-formed set of preferences that are exogenous to the environment, and a desire to maximize their individual positions given the positions of others. Within this model, the social contract is an ahistorical act that creates institutions that are either permanent or else can be changed only by unanimous consent. This assumption could not be more contrary to the Spencer/Darwin view that human beings are biological products of natural selection, that they have characteristics and tastes predetermined by ancestry, and that human governmental institutions continually evolve just as much as human physical characteristics. Within this paradigm, human beings are hardly autonomous; they are the pawns of nature. Further, governmental obligations do not arise out of a single ahistorical agreement. Rather, they are the product of centuries of trial and error, from which the fittest forms of social organization survive. In Social Darwinism, the state's duty of noninterference does not arise out of any kind of express or implied social contract; it arises out of the perception that a more activist welfare state would prevent the evolutionary process from running its course. When the state intervenes to aid the weak, it permits them to survive and procreate, and burdens others with their care. The result is a loss of absolute progress for civilization as a whole, or else that a particular society falls behind in the worldwide struggle for existence, victimized by its own poor and unproductive members.
Spencer thus rejected contractarianism's assumption that human beings have free will and are able to maximize utility through cooperation. Rather, the rules by which states developed were external to human inventiveness and were part of the natural developmental process.
88 A "social contract" to explain human organization was no more rational to the Social Darwinist than was a social contract theory to explain the high level of social organization that can be observed among bees or beavers, or the herding instincts of cows or geese.
The closest Spencer came to espousing any notion of social contract was in The Man Versus the State, first published in 1884. Speaking as an evolutionist, he concluded that the entire "hypothesis" of a social contract was "baseless." Such a contract could never bind succeeding generations; the natural selection process might drive any subsequent social group to abrogate it. However, Spencer did consider what the state would be like if it were the product of an agreement produced by the unanimous consent of its citizens. 8 9 He then concluded that these citizens would in fact agree about very little, 
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[Vol. 104: 2309 except perhaps the public defense and some principles of criminal law.'o Much more important for Spencer was the private contract. Indeed, he believed that the state's only legitimate function was to enforce the mutual obligations of citizens. 9 '
Other evolutionists, such as the great English legal historian Sir Henry Maine, absolutely rejected the social contract theory as inconsistent with the historical development of political institutions, and as something cooked up by lawyers to serve their own political ends.9 A central point of Maine's most important work, Ancient Law, was that notions of legal obligation and rights had evolved gradually, passing first through a long period when legal relationships were based on status or the family into which one was born. Contract ideas of social obligation were a recent development in this historical evolution, and were used entirely by philosophers to justify their own notions of the state as it existed. Thus, the Lockean social contract was "only the dress by which the ancient views were rendered more attractive to a particular generation of the modems. 93 William Graham Sumner, America's leading Social Darwinist intellectual, was even more skeptical of the social contract than Spencer and Maine. He regarded political theories as nothing more than a few of the many "folkways," or customs that have evolved slowly in organized human society.' Under this theory, the doctrine of social compact was nothing more than rationalization used by those who wished to be free of the more hierarchical medieval rationalizations.
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The idea that a contractarian ideology explains the Fuller Court's hostility to regulation and welfarism is thought-provoking. Fiss does not adequately support this idea, however, and there are many reasons for thinking it is wrong. 90. Id. 91. Id. at 181. Spencer then ends this chapter with these words: "1The function of lUberalism in the past was that of putting a limit to the powers of kings. The function of true liberalism in the future will be that of putting a limit to the powers of Parliaments." Id. at 183. When the Americans, in 1776, revolted against the colonial policy of England. they found a great number of principles afloat .... The first paragraph of the Declaration of Independence contains a number of these great principles which were supposed to be axioms of political philosophy. In 1898, when we forced our rule on the Philippine Islands, some of these principles were very inconvenient. In time we shall have to drop others of them. There are no dogmatic propositions of political philosophy which are universally and always true; there arc views which prevail, at a time, for a while, and then fade away and give place to other views. 95. Id.
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II. PROGRESSIVE BUSINESS REGULATION AND THE FULLER COURT
A. The Antitrust Movement
A sizable part of the Fuller Court's agenda concerned the respective roles of the market, sovereign oversight of competition, and sovereign displacement of competition with alternative regulatory regimes. Fiss' book handles these issues thoughtfully but provokes some questions about two areas in particular: the antitrust movement and the appropriate constitutional limits on state power to regulate rates.
The antitrust movement provided conservatives and Progressives with common ground. On the one hand, antitrust reflected the classical preference for the market's allocation of resources. On the other, it appealed to the Progressive belief that markets are fragile and sometimes require state intervention. Mainstream Progressives were not socialists, but neither did they share the Jacksonian view that governmental intervention in the marketplace was an inherently bad thing. As a result, conservatives such as Taft and Peckham and Progressive liberals such as Theodore Roosevelt and Brandeis could all support antitrust.
Fiss' treatment notes the broad, essentially "constitutional" nature of the Court's antitrust analysis during these formative years. 96 The Fuller Court did not view antitrust in "technocratic" terms.' Its principal concerns were not with defining monopoly in terms of effect on price and output, nor with determining precisely which practices ought to be condemned and which approved. Rather, the important issues concerned the relationship between federal and state power under the Commerce Clause, between federal antitrust and state corporate law, between federal antitrust and the common law of trade restraints, and between constitutionally protected contractual freedom and any possible right to make anticompetitive contracts. Entering into this territory for the first time, the Court necessarily painted with a broad brush. In particular, the new federal antitrust statute forced federal judges to consider the appropriate relationship between state and federal power to regulate business that, to an increasing degree, was engaged in interstate commerce. They also considered the proper scope of the nation's commitment to the market and its strictly collateral and subservient commitment to liberty of contract. The Supreme Court protected liberty of contract when it viewed its own role as that of market facilitator but stepped back from liberty of contract when the contract at issue became a threat to the market itself-as, for example, in the case of price-fixing agreements. 
The Relation Between Federal Antitrust and State Common and Corporate Law
The strength of Fiss' treatment is his recognition and analysis of the "constitutional" issues that confronted the Fuller Court in the antitrust cases.
Its weakness is his failure to relate the Court's more technical decision making to the substantive problems it was confronting. The issues he describes as merely "technocratic," such as the difference between cartels and mergers, were hardly peripheral to the development of antitrust policy even in the Fuller period. Rather, they were central to the neoclassical economic concept of the firm and defined the domain of the common law long before the Sherman Act was passed.
The practices challenged under the Sherman Act were extremely diverse. For example, E.C. Knight" and Northern Securities'0° were merger cases. Trans-Missouri,' 0 ' Joint Traffic, 1 2 and Addyston Pipe' 3 were pricefixing cases. Standard Oil' 4 and American Tobacco,"' decided the year after the Fuller term ended, involved exclusionary practices by dominant firms. Thanks to a century of development of more "technocratic" antitrust rules, today these practices are regarded as categorically different and are subjected to different modes of analysis.' 0 6 Many of the Fuller Court Justices were sufficiently sensitive to technical issues to see important differences between naked price fixing or boycotts, and more efficient integrations of productive capacity such as mergers. Although the members of the Fuller Court did not articulate these differences in modem terms,' 0 7 they perceived them, and their perceptions account for much of the Court's apparent lack of direction.
At the same time, the more "constitutional" issues such as Commerce Clause doctrine effectively enabled the Court to evade the substantive issues. For example, a merger among manufacturers was a combination that pertained to manufacturing, and, within the ruling model of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, manufacturing was not commerce, even if the goods were intended to be sold across state lines. By contrast, a cartel existed only to sell, 107. For example, cartel agreements between independent firms were treated as contracts in restraint of trade at common law. By contrast, a merger, which involved one firm's purchase of all the assets or shares of another, was treated as a simple transfer or acquisition of property, something that the common law hardly viewed with suspicion. See, e.g., Northern Sec. Co. v Although traditionalists and Progressives found some common ground in antitrust, they hardly had the same ideas about the substantive course that antitrust should take. Their differences went straight to underlying political ideologies. For example, Progressives believed that labor unions, or "combinations of labor," should be exempt from antitrust prosecution. By contrast, the treatise writers who represented the elite corporate profession believed that combinations of labor and combinations of capital were no different from one another. What was sauce for the gander was sauce for the goose."' In fact, one of the most important battlegrounds over antitrust's agenda concerned its use as an antilabor device. During the Fuller period the traditionalists largely won: The Sherman Act was used to break up combinations of labor more often than combinations of capital." 2 Traditionalists and Progressives also differed on the range of business activities that federal antitrust should condemn. The orthodox position, to which Holmes subscribed, was that antitrust should concern itself mainly with combinations in restraint of trade, which had always been the concern of the common law. Chief among these offenses were boycotts" 3 and covenants not to compete. Price fixing was a little more problematic, because consumers were free to walk away-that is, no one was being coerced. 114 However, price-fixing agreements were unenforceable at common law even though they were probably not substantively illegal. 1 ' 5 In cases that the Supreme Court identified as price fixing, the majority consistently condemned the activity." 6 Resale price maintenance, or vertical price fixing, had a similarly ambiguous common law legacy, but the Supreme Court condemned it as well. ' 7 At common law, each of these offenses involved agreements between distinct firms. That is, they were "loose" agreements among firms rather than "tighter" unions, such as mergers, that substantially reorganized the firms and unified their operations.
The principal problem facing the Fuller Court was how to define the scope of antitrust in those areas where the common law had been ambiguous or had refused to condemn the practice in question. Although the common law had been concerned about conduct, such as boycotts and price fixing, it had virtually nothing to say about structure. There was no common law merger policy. Existing state merger policy did not develop out of the common law at all, but rather out of state corporate law-principally, through state incorporation statutes that limited the scope of a corporation's business activities. The state-instigated merger cases of the Gilded Age were not based on allegations that mergers were contracts or combinations in restraint of trade, but on claims that the merging firms had violated one or more provisions in their corporate charters."1 8 By contrast, the Sherman Act was based on the common law of trade restraints and said nothing at all about state corporate law. Neither was it in any sense a federal law of corporations. The Fuller Court, interpreting the Sherman Act for the first time, naturally found merger cases much more difficult than cartel cases.
The common law had taken no position on mergers or other structural offenses, mainly because it developed during a period when there were only a few big corporations, most of which were heavily regulated through their charters. "Monopoly" in the common law lexicon referred not to big corporations generally, but to corporations that had franchises from the sovereign giving them exclusive rights." 9 On the one hand, the merger was a "combination" that could restrain trade by permitting former rivals to fix prices or avoid competition with each other. On the other hand, the merger was hardly a cartel; it united firms into one, and any "price fixing" that occurred happened only after the firms had become a single entity.
The initial result of these ambiguities was E.C. Knight, 'o which held that the Sherman Act did not reach a merger among sugar refiners. Fiss excellent treatment of the Commerce Clause issues in that case is compromised only by his failure to read between the lines-a hazardous activity and perhaps one that the historian should avoid in any event. The Commerce Clause analysis, which was orthodox, enabled the Court to evade the more difficult substantive question of whether the Sherman Act reached a firm's purchase of plants from another firm when the common law had never condemned such transactions. Further, state corporate law seemed to provide adequate tools for dealing with the substantive question. State corporate law could limit the types of business corporations could conduct, forbid them from buying assets located in a different state, and even dissolve them if necessary. Later, however, the Northern Securities1 2 1 case failed to provide the Court with such an easy escape. That decision involved a stock acquisition through a holding company that was legal under state corporate law.'2 In addition, the merger involved railroads that carried goods across state lines, and by 1904 it was clear that the Sherman Act reached interstate movement. As a result, Northern Securities forced a decision on the merits; even then, fourteen years after the Sherman Act was passed, the Supreme Court was deeply divided on the question. Harlan and three other Justices signed the opinion of the Court condemning the merger, theorizing that it created a monopoly. Brewer concurred, and Holmes, Fuller, White, and Peckham dissented.
Holmes concluded that elimination of competition by merger was not within the scope of the Sherman Act. Fiss suggests that this conclusion was purportedly based on the statute's "plain language."' 2 The statute, after all, says nothing about competition. But Holmes indicated that his views came from the common law, and the common law had never concerned itself with the voluntary elimination of competition by merger. If one firm purchased another firm's plant, the transaction was simply a transfer of property-hardly a contract in restraint of trade. Holmes' position was amply supported by the legislative history of the Sherman Act. Many of its proponents recited their purpose as federalizing the common law because multistate businesses had grown so large as to exceed the jurisdictional limits of state courts. 24 To be sure, as Fiss notes, Justice Peckham had appeared to separate the common law and the Sherman Act in Trans-Missouri,25 by holding that price-fixing agreements were illegal without inquiry into their reasonableness.' 26 The 121. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) . 122. In the meantime, New Jersey had amended its corporate laws to permit one corporation to own shares in another corporation--something that 19th-century corporate law had generally forbidden. HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 1I, at 257-58.
123. Fiss, supra note 1, at 138-39. 124. See, e.g., 20 CONG. REC. 1167 (1889) (statement of Sen. Sherman); HOVENKAMP, supra note 106, § 2.1b.
125. FfSS, supra note 1, at 140. 126. However, even this conclusion cannot be pushed too far. At common law, price-fixing agreements were not illegal, but they were unenforceable among the parties, and nothing in the common law decisions suggests that only "unreasonable" price-fixing agreements would be denied enforcement. See HOVENKAMP, difficulty presented by the embryonic per se rule of the early price-fixing cases, however, was that it would have made every merger unlawful, just as it made every cartel unlawful. No one sitting on the bench when Northern Securities was decided wanted that, including Peckham, who dissented with Holmes in Northern Securities. 127 In merger cases, unlike collusion cases, some rule had to be developed for separating the sheep from the goats, and the question was where to look. Holmes' search through the common law was hardly an irrational starting point, although Holmes' particular interpretation did not prove to be very credible. The "rule of reason" that eventually developed proved more helpful, but it was at best superficially tied to the common law." 2 Probably the most important of the "constitutional" antitrust issues confronting the Fuller Court, as Fiss describes them, concerned the power of the federal government to regulate practices that did not immediately involve the movement of goods across state lines. The Court's first, tentative answer in E.C. Knight in 1895 was to limit that power and leave the matter to the states. 29 On this question, Fiss agrees with Progressive "class justice" critiques, 30 which note that just as the Court was rejecting the federal government's attempt to break up the interstate sugar monopoly, it was also approving the aggressive Sherman Act campaign against Eugene Debs and the Pullman strike.' 3 ' Fiss tries to minimize the damage caused by this critique by observing that the juxtaposition was probably just a "fluke of the adjudicatory process." law was quite up to the problem of dealing with corporate asset acquisitions. 35 By contrast, both Debs and Trans-Missouri involved restraints on the interstate movement of railroad cargo and passengers-an activity that was outside the jurisdictional reach of any single state, and clearly within the federal commerce power as historically defined.
Even more important, E.C. Knight involved a merger, and the common law, which was the established repository of antitrust substance, had nothing to say about mergers. By contrast, Trans-Missouri involved a cartel, and the Debs Pullman strike involved both a boycott and a cartel. In sum, the Court treated cartels consistently by always condemning them (Debs, Trans-Missouri, Joint Traffic, Addyston Pipe) . It had a much more difficult time with mergers (E.C. Knight, Northern Securities), where efficiency was potentially present and the common law had nothing to say. To be sure, concerns for class justice may have been present, but it is hardly inescapable that it drove the differing outcomes in E.C. Knight and Debs.
The Relation Between Federal Antitrust and Constitutional Liberty of Contract
The second major constitutional issue confronting the Fuller Court in Sherman Act cases concerned the relationship between "liberty of contract" and the clear limitation on contracts among business firms that the Sherman Act threatened to impose. The Supreme Court's leader through this disputed territory was Justice Peckham, one of the Court's strongest advocates of a constitutionally protected liberty of contract, 36 who nonetheless believed that the Sherman Act placed perfectly appropriate limits on contracts that threatened to injure competition. Justice Peckham developed this paradigm with great confidence when the practice at issue was price fixing-something that he saw as a private attempt to regulate interstate commerce, a power the Constitution had clearly given to Congress.' 38 But he refused to push the point so far as to reach a merger, which was (1) not a violation of the common law and (2) an acquisition or sale of property, not simply a contract eliminating competition. He was one of the dissenters in the Northern Securities merger case.
The ambiguity left by Northern Securities was that it appeared to condemn all mergers, just as Law, 1869 -1903 , 53 Bus. HIST. REV. 304 (1979 ). 136. E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52-65 (1905 See, e.g., appeared to condemn all price fixing. As Fiss notes, the year after Fuller retired, the new Chief Justice, White, used the common law "rule of reason" formulation to bring common sense to the Sherman Act and, in the process, to restore its constitutionality under liberty-of-contract doctrine. 39 A statute that prevented "every" contract or combination in restraint of trade would interfere with constitutional liberty of contract, certainly if every merger, no matter how slight, was to be considered a contract in restraint of trade. By reading the word "unreasonable" into the statute, Chief Justice White made clear that the only restraints that it condemned were those that constitutional liberty of contract never would have protected in the first place. While this reading is a historically sensible attempt to harmonize Lochnerstyle liberty of contract with the contractual restrictiveness of the Sherman Act, it robs the Sherman Act of its independent policy role. Fiss' reading of the rule of reason implies one of two things. First, the Sherman Act had nothing to do with market competitiveness and simply condemned every contract in restraint of trade that the Constitution did not protect. Second, and alternatively, inherent within the doctrine of substantive due process was some notion of competitiveness that protected contracts that did not injure competition, while refusing to protect contracts that did. In that case, the concern with competitiveness was there, but it lay in substantive due process doctrine rather than in the Sherman Act itself.
B. Rate Regulation and the Judicial Assault on Munn v. Illinois
Fiss describes the Fuller Court's position on the rise of modem priceregulated industry' 4 as an assault on the doctrine of Munn v. Illinois.' Munn held that an unincorporated business firm could be price-regulated if it operated in a part of the market thought to be "affected with the public interest." 4 2 Munn thus permitted states to regulate the rates of firms that had not initially agreed to rate regulation as a condition of receiving a corporate charter. For firms with such charters, the state's power to regulate rates was clear, as long as the state adhered to the charter's terms. Charter-based regulation was never a challenge to constitutional liberty of contract. On the contrary, it was nothing more than enforcement of a contract, the corporate charter, which even the most committed Jacksonian could support.
Power to regulate by statute meant that a state could regulate prices at its whim, even when the firm had never agreed to a corporate charter permitting 139. See FISS, supra note 1, at 148-50. 140. By modem price regulation, I mean a regime in which firms arc pnce-regulated by statute and not by provisions contained in their corporate charters. On the important policy and constitutional differences, see HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 1I, at 125-30.
141. 94 U.S. 113 (1877) ; see FtSs, supra note I, at 185-89. 142. 94 U.S. at 126. regulation or, indeed, when it had no corporate charter at all. This power was awesome, both because it lacked any substantive limit and because of its ex post facto nature: The firm was made subject to price regulation after it had made its investment in the market. The significance of Munn is that it approved statutory price regulation in principle. Munn itself did not resolve some important questions: (1) To which industries may statutory price regulation be applied? (2) What are the substantive limits on the sovereign's power to reduce a firm's prices? (3) To what extent may a state regulate prices in interstate commerce? A better title for Fiss' thoughtful chapter on price regulation would describe the Court's treatment of Munn not as an assault, but as an attempt to define appropriate limits for a doctrine that was universally acknowledged to require some kind of substantive limitations, even by the Munn opinion itself.
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But as Fiss makes clear, the Fuller Court's decisions on rate regulation cannot be characterized simply as good faith efforts to adhere to Munn, but rather as attempts to define its inherent limitations. Some of the Justices, most notably Brewer, were completely hostile to the very concept of rate regulation and wished to overrule Munn altogether. 44 In the final analysis the moderates won out, however, and Munn was never limited much beyond its own explicit restrictions and the limits imposed on extraterritorial regulation by the Commerce Clause. 45 Fiss reads the Fuller Court's position as more restrictive of Munn than it was in fact. Munn had never been intended to permit price regulation of any business that the state might wish to regulate. Rather, regulation was limited to those firms that were "affected with the public interest." That terminology had a fairly technical meaning and referred to the seventeenth-century English concept of "prerogatives of the Crown"-i.e., businesses that could not be practiced by anyone who wished, but that required the Crown's permission. This language gave way to the somewhat more technical conception of "public service corporations" in the 1890's treatise literature, and then to the modem conception of "utilities." Railroads clearly fell into this conception; grain elevators like the one at issue in Munn did not. Even Justice Brewer's opinion for the Court in Reagan,1 4 which held that a rate regulation must permit a fair return on the entrepreneur's investment, was in no sense an assault on Munn or a limit on its intended domain, unless one believes that Munn would have approved rates conceded to deny the firm an appropriate return on its 143. The Munn opinion limited its holding to businesses "affected with a public interest" without defining precisely what this meant. In subsequent years, the Court was hard put to identify precisely what affected a business with the public interest. See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 11, at 199-204.
144. See FISS, supra investment. 4 7 Although the question was not before the Court, everything about its decision suggested that the Court intended to permit states to force monopoly firms to behave more like competitive firms-not that it intended to permit states to use regulation to drive firms out of business.
The fairest reading of the Supreme Court's fits and starts in the area of price regulation is not that the Court was hostile toward all regulation; nor that it was trying to apply contractarian principles to determine the permissible bounds of rate regulation.' 4 Contractarianism would have outlawed all regulation, for the owners of regulated firms would always object. Rather, the Court was looking to economics, which was only then in the process of developing a generalized theory of regulated markets. The Supreme Court was engaged in economic policymaking in precisely the way it was engaged in economic policymaking when it attempted to define the appropriate limits of the Sherman Act through the rule of reason, or to define the appropriate scope of workplace regulation in Lochner. The story of that commitment has been revised several times to account for the weak evidence supporting it. In the original version, Union armies and black and carpetbagger politicians created a post-Civil War regime of racial integration. This regime dominated Southern social life from 1865 until the late 1870's or early 1880'ssO The 1875 Civil Rights Act, the only federal statute applying to privately owned public accommodations, was passed contemporaneously with Union withdrawal in order to ensure that this 147. Dicta in Munn suggested no limit on the legislative power to set rates, and it further suggested that a legislative determination of what is reasonable should not be subject to judicial review. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 133-34 (1877 integration would be continued after Southern political self-determination had been restored. But the Supreme Court first upset this strategy by declaring the 1875 Act unconstitutional in 1883,'15 thus paving the way for a return to Southern white domination and segregation. The icing on the cake was Plessy, which legitimated the subsequent segregationist era that today goes by the name "Jim Crow." Fiss acknowledges that some of this story is wrong. He describes the rise of racial segregation in the South as something that occurred after the Civil War, rather than after Reconstruction. 152 But that naturally provokes the question, "rise from what?" There is no evidence that the Old South was a regime in which free black and white strangers shared seats on trains or the same floors in hotels or the same dining rooms in restaurants on a full and equal basis. In fact, they did not even share them on a segregated basis. Except for servants, blacks in the South before the war were generally excluded from restaurants, hotels, parks, theaters, and other places of amusement.
III. RACE RELATIONS AND THE
53
Railroads and steamships accepted black passengers under the common carrier's general common law duty to serve all paying customers, but they were almost universally accorded inferior accommodations. In most cases this meant the smoking car, but in some parts of Alabama in 1871, after the Union Army was in control and Reconstruction mores were well established, blacks were forced to ride in the open platforms at the ends of passenger train cars. 54 Any pre-Civil War integration existed within the hierarchical slavemaster relationship, and consisted mainly in the ability of white people to bring their slaves with them into public facilities and send them on errands. For free blacks, the right to accommodations was determined by the whim of the proprietor. The evidence suggests a variety of practices, but outright integration was clearly the exception rather than the rule.
Plessy's significance in our time is unambiguous and readily comprehended. One needs only to compare Plessy's conclusion that "separate but equal" is permissible state policy with Brown's conclusion sixty years later that separate facilities are inherently unequal. 55 Numerous historians have presented the road to Brown as the Supreme Court's decisive unraveling of the Jim Crow regime that Plessy represents.
But was Plessy so significant in its own time? Although Plessy upheld a statute that actually expanded existing rights of blacks to public accommodations, its contemporaries believed it to be a minor decision, hardly rocking-indeed, barely tilting-the boat of American social relations. Indeed, Charles Warren, the Progressive era's greatest constitutional historian, wrote a chapter on the Fuller Court in his multivolume history of the Supreme Court that did not even discuss Plessy.
156 By contrast, the Progressive critique of Plessy insists that in the minds of U.S. citizens at the time, Plessy represented the final, decisive undoing of the Union's Reconstruction agenda. 5 7 According to the latter account, Congress perceived that the withdrawal of Union armies would result in lax enforcement of Northern-imposed regimes in Southern states. In 1875, it passed the second civil rights act guaranteeing "equal access" to public accommodations for blacks. What the Reconstruction forces could no longer provide, perhaps the federal courts could. But, the story goes, this program was almost completely undermined in 1883 when the Supreme Court declared the 1875 Civil Rights Act unconstitutional. Plessy effectively finished the job by compelling what the 1875 Act would have expressly prohibited: segregated accommodations.
In fact, Plessy in life was hardly a shadow of Plessy in death. It passed with little notice because the plaintiff's claim that segregation is inherently harmful was foreign to nearly everyone's constitutional values. The strong case for Plessy as a ground-breaking civil rights decision must rest on two propositions, neither of which can be established. The first is that Congress passed the 1875 Civil Rights Act in order to achieve the kind of social integration that was compelled by 1960's civil rights legislation. The second is that a right to social integration is discemable in either the language or the constitutional history of the Fourteenth Amendment.
First, racial integration did not divide Republicans and traditionalists in the late nineteenth century in the way that protective labor legislation did. Little evidence suggests that any politically significant group wanted forced social integration of public schools, railroads, hotels, or anything else. Political liberals may have been more concerned with black welfare and legal rights, but they were as racist as conservatives on questions of multiracial social relations. Even American Progressives unapologetically shared these views.' 157. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 74 (1975 Reconstruction Republicans, the champions of racial equality following the Civil War, took great care to distinguish political equality and social equality. They espoused the former but not the latter. For example, the platform of the 1874 Alabama Republican Party, a puppet for Northern Reconstruction forces, stated that the party "does not desire mixed schools or accommodations for colored people, but . . . ask [s] that in all these advantages they shall be equal."' 59 Within this paradigm, "separate but equal" statutes were considered a step forward for newly freed slaves, not backward.
Second, there is no evidence that the kind of social integration compelled by the expansive civil rights legislation of the 1960's was contemplated by anyone when the Civil War Amendments or civil rights statutes were passed. Historians who wrote about Gilded Age race relations generally saw them in the same segregation-integration paradigm characteristic of the Warren Court era. If it is not segregation, it must be integration. But this dichotomy misstates the range of mid-nineteenth-century Southern racial practices and the congressional corrective. The practices included not a dichotomy, but a trichotomy: integration, segregation, and exclusion. During the Civil War and Reconstruction, the common practice was not to give black Americans segregated facilities, but to deny them any access at all."W During both periods, hospitals, hotels, restaurants, and other facilities simply excluded blacks altogether. Before the Civil War, blacks were excluded from the public school systems. During Reconstruction, public schools for blacks were set up, but strictly on a segregated basis.1 6 ' The prevailing practice in railroads was to deny blacks first-class seating completely and to seat blacks in the smoking car, which was generally reserved not merely for smokers, but for lower-class passengers bearing cheaper tickets.
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When Reconstruction governments intervened on behalf of blacks, they were concerned with access, not with integration. As a result, they responded with "separate but equal" statutes, which were designed not to segregate what had been integrated, but rather to provide access where there had been no access, or capriciously granted access, or access only on clearly unequal terms. For example, during Reconstruction, two states that were dominated by constitutional lawyer, to argue before the Supreme Court. Never once in the challenge, in Justice Brewer's opinion for the Court upholding the statute, " or in Justice Harlan's dissent,1 75 did anyone even suggest that the Equal Protection Clause might be relevant to a separate but equal statute. In sum, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the equal protection argument in Plessy was an afterthought. The argument that the Fourteenth Amendment might have something to do with social integration does not lie in the language or history of the Civil War or congressional redesign of the structure of post-emancipation race relations. Rather, it was first cooked up sometime between 1890 and 1896 in order to create a second route for challenging the constitutionality of state separate but equal laws. That story is much more consistent with the history of the American commitment to racial equality.
IV. CONCLUSION
As Fiss' book points out, thp Fuller Court gives us little to cheer about. A group of Justices gave themselves the constitutional power to delay or prevent the development of the modern regulatory and welfare state. Whether they were right or wrong on the merits, what they did was not the prerogative of judges. For that reason, of course, Holmes is a hero to contemporary conservatives and liberals alike. On the one hand, he did not put much confidence in the welfare and regulatory state. On the other, he knew the difference between being a legislator and being a judge.
For all its shortcomings, the Fuller Court provides us with powerful lessons about judicial power, modernity, economics, and human nature. As Fiss' book illustrates, however, the lessons are hidden in a confoundingly complex debate about origins and influences. Historians' theses about the origins and motivations of Fuller Court doctrine are extremely diverse and often incompatible. By all comparative measures, most of the Justices of the Fuller Court were reactionary, narrow, and lacking in vision. Perhaps for these reasons they serve as such excellent mirrors of the elite milieu they lived in, but that the American democratic process rejected.
174. In upholding the statute, Justice Brewer noted that Mississippi's own courts had cotstrued the statute to apply only to intrastate passengers. 133 U.S. at 591-92; see also Hovcnkamp. supra note 161. at 646-47 (discussing Louisville decision).
175. 133 U.S. at 592-94.
